Institutional Trading

Correspondent Banking Is How Money Crosses a Border

No bank has accounts everywhere, so payments travel through chains of banks holding accounts with each other. Each link adds cost, delay, and a compliance decision.

↩ Looking BackPart of the 2020 to 2026 retrospective, written in July 2026. The date below marks the 2024 events this piece revisits, not when it was published, so it draws on everything known through mid 2026.
Nathan Xiang·January 17, 2024

The Structure

A bank in one country needing to send money to another country generally has no account there. It uses a correspondent: a bank in the destination country that holds an account for it.

The sending bank holds an account with the correspondent, called a nostro account from its perspective and a vostro account from the correspondent perspective. Payments are settled by debiting and crediting those accounts.

Where no direct relationship exists, the payment travels through a chain of intermediaries, each holding an account with the next.

There is no global payment system. There is a network of bilateral relationships, and a payment finds a route through it the way a parcel finds a route through a delivery network.

Why It Is Slow and Expensive

FrictionCause
Multiple intermediariesEach takes a fee and adds delay
Time zone mismatchSettlement windows do not overlap
Compliance screeningEach institution screens independently
Pre funded accountsCapital tied up in nostro balances
Opaque pricingFees deducted along the route

The pre funding requirement is a substantial hidden cost. To settle payments in a currency, a bank must hold balances in that currency in advance, which is capital sitting idle across many accounts globally.

Messaging is handled by a standardised network that transmits instructions between banks. It is frequently described as moving money, and it does not. It carries the messages, and the money moves through the account relationships.

The Retreat

The number of correspondent relationships has declined substantially, in a process called de risking.

The driver was compliance economics. Anti money laundering and sanctions obligations require a bank to understand not only its customer but its customer customers, which is difficult across a chain. Enforcement penalties for failures have been very large.

Faced with modest revenue from a small market and potentially enormous penalties, the rational decision is to exit the relationship entirely.

The consequence fell on smaller economies, particularly some Caribbean and Pacific states and jurisdictions perceived as higher risk. Losing correspondent access can disconnect a country from the international payment system, affecting trade finance and remittances, which are lifeline income for many households.

The Perverse Outcome

Regulation designed to prevent illicit finance pushed legitimate activity out of the regulated system.

Payments that can no longer travel through banks travel through less transparent channels instead, which is worse for the objective the rules were meant to serve.

Regulators have acknowledged this and have encouraged proportionate rather than wholesale de risking, with limited effect, since the underlying penalty asymmetry has not changed.

What Is Changing It

Several developments are compressing the friction. Standardised richer message formats improve automation and reduce manual investigation. Domestic instant payment systems in many countries are being linked directly, bypassing correspondent chains for some routes. And specialist providers pre fund local accounts themselves, netting flows internally rather than moving money across borders for each transaction.

That last model is what most consumer focused cross border providers actually do. The money frequently does not cross the border at all. Balances are held on both sides and netted, which is faster and cheaper than routing each payment.

The Bottom Line

Cross border payments travel through chains of bilateral correspondent relationships, each adding cost, delay, and an independent compliance decision. The network shrank because compliance risk outweighed revenue on marginal relationships, disconnecting some economies entirely and pushing activity toward less visible channels. The improvements come from linking domestic instant payment systems and from providers that net flows rather than moving money.

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